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force that arise from electing unready
presidents and using poor or flawed
strategic judgment, and to ensure that
sufficient knowledge and understanding
of the reasons for using or rejecting
military force are in place. He calls for
a “brains based approach” to strategic
thinking—a term that I, as army and
defense chief, borrowed shamelessly.
He proposes a “Bletchley Park–like
capacity” for using open-source material
available on social media and unclassified avenues such as Google Earth to
enhance knowledge and understanding.
Some of Ullman’s recommendations are
unique to the United States, but in the
main any and all leaders and students
of national security will benefit greatly
from this book. Indeed, to reinforce
the recommendation of Messrs. Powell,
Kerry, and Jones, read this book! And,
as Lord Dobbs adds, this is a very
good and intriguing read as well.
LORD RICHARDS OF HERSTMONCEUX

Fragile Rise: Grand Strategy and the Fate of Imperial Germany, 1871–1914, by Xu Qiyu, trans.
Joshua Hill. Foreword by Graham Allison. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. 368 pages. $32.

Once in a great while, a book allows the
familiar to be viewed through new eyes.
Fragile Rise is such a volume. On its
surface, it is an account of imperial Germany’s catastrophic grand strategy between the nation’s founding in 1871 and
the onset of the First World War. While
this is well-tilled ground, Fragile Rise
provides a clear and convincing account
of how Otto von Bismarck mitigated the
tensions created by Germany’s newfound
power within the European system, and
how his successors failed at the same
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task. But what makes Fragile Rise unique
is less what it says than who is saying
it. The author, Xu Qiyu, is an activeduty colonel in the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) who serves
as deputy director of the Institute for
Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University in Beijing—the counterpart
to the U.S. National Defense University.
USN readers who harbor cartoonish
images of our PLA counterparts may
be surprised at the depth of research
and insight offered in this volume. Xu
has been a visiting fellow and guest of a
number of prestigious Western institutions, including the Naval War College,
where he is respected as a subtle and
engaging thinker. His research and writing reflect that experience, informed by
international scholarship and primarysource material from across Europe.
Throughout the book, Xu draws no
explicit parallels between the German
and Chinese experiences, although the
book’s translator points out that the
cover of the Chinese edition features the
words “When it is difficult to see clearly
into the future, looking back into history, even the history of other peoples,
might be the right choice.” In China
there is a long tradition of using historical examples to offer implicit criticism
of what may not be criticized officially,
and how Fragile Rise can be viewed in
this light is apparent upon reading.
Xu characterizes the newly unified
Germany as following a “hide and bide”
strategy, recalling Deng Xiaoping’s
guidance that an emerging China
should hide its capabilities and bide its
time, avoiding international leadership
and the complications that come from
displays of power. By 1878, however,
Germany found itself a factor and a
source of concern in the international
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arena, despite its preference for the
low-key. Bismarck’s active management
mitigated the international friction
that this shift in power engendered. If
one seeks a hopeful message, Graham
Allison observes in his foreword that
Xu proposes that skilled leaders can
“reshape unfavorable situations.”
Nonetheless, Xu notes that Bismarck was
managing a “fundamental” conflict, one
woven into the fabric of a possible power
transition. The environment was rife
with suspicion, and the European system
offered little tolerance for strategic error.
Xu assesses that, following Bismarck’s
dismissal, Germany committed two
significant blunders. First, it embarked
on an expensive naval expansion that
was tangential to its core interests. Its
appetite for such an effort was fed by
a consistent insensitivity to the value
Great Britain placed on sea power.
Dismissing arguments that German
overseas trade and colonial possessions
justified the risk of strategic confrontation, Xu notes that Tirpitz’s “luxury
fleet” cost Germany any chance of
accommodation with Britain. By 1907,
as Germany’s primary strategic
adversary—despite significant
economic and cultural ties—Britain
embraced what was effectively
a containment policy.
Second, Xu is similarly critical of the
German army’s failure to subordinate its
military planning to Germany’s wider
political ends. Given that Xu serves a
military controlled by a single political
party, there is perhaps no more pointed
criticism in the PLA vernacular.
Fragile Rise devotes lengthy and
thoughtful attention to the role of
popular opinion in driving Germany
to unwise strategic choices. Germany’s
rapid rise was a source of pride among

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/13

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 153

B O O K R E V I E WS

153

the German people, but it created
pressures that German institutions were
poorly prepared to mitigate. Indeed, Xu
argues that the Weltpolitik policy of the
late Wilhelmine period was primarily
a product of domestic pressures. In a
China in which the ruling Communist
Party makes massive investments in
managing, shaping, and controlling
public opinion, such concern resonates.
At least one American reviewer has been
critical of the tendency for U.S. readers
to view Fragile Rise through the lens of
United States–China power dynamics,
arguing that it should be respected as a
contribution to the historical literature
in its own right. While this is true,
naval professionals naturally—given the
author’s association with China’s senior
military college—will be less interested
in issues of historical interpretation
than of Chinese perceptions of historical
corollary.
It is possible that an American reader
will be left with the impression that a
lively debate over the wisdom of China’s
present course is ongoing. In fact, Fragile
Rise was completed in 2011 during the
closing days of Hu Jintao’s rule, when
the environment in Beijing was more
open and China’s course less certain. Xi
Jinping effectively has ended this debate.
Recent pronouncements of the ruling
Communist Party leave no doubt that
China has embraced its expanding role
in the world and the naval expansion
that supports it. All that remains to see is
whether China can produce a Bismarck
who can navigate around the shoals
along the way. In the meantime, Fragile
Rise presents a small window into a
debate that largely has passed into history already, as well as the thinking that
accompanied the charting of that course.
DALE C. RIELAGE
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